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1161 
THE FTDA’S “CAUSES DILUTION” CAUSING 
PROBLEMS: ANALYZING THE RINGLING BROS. 
AND NABISCO STANDARDS AFTER THE 
TRADEMARK AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1999 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 1996, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA)
1
 has 
provided a federal cause of action for trademark dilution.
2
 In the years 
following the enactment of the FTDA, the circuits split over the meaning of 
the phrase “causes dilution” in clause one of the FTDA.3 In Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel 
Development,
4
 the Fourth Circuit held that a senior user
5
 must prove that the 
junior user
6
 caused “actual economic harm”7 to the senior user’s famous 
trademark in order to obtain relief for trademark dilution under the FTDA.
8
 
In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
9
 however, the Second Circuit expressly 
disagreed with the Ringling Bros. standard,
10
 holding that a senior user need 
 
 
 1. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. V 1999)). 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) provides:  
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such 
terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person’s commercial use in 
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and 
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided 
in this subsection . . . . (2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous 
mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 of this title unless the 
person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner’s reputation 
or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous 
mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this title, 
subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 2. See infra notes 19-34 and accompanying text for discussion of the history of trademark 
dilution. 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (providing that relief may be obtained if a mark is famous and “causes 
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark”). 
 4. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999). 
 5. A “senior user” is the first entity to use a mark. See Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 
889 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The first to use a mark on a product or service in a particular 
geographic market, the senior user, acquires rights in the mark in that market.”).  
 6. A “junior user” is any user of the same or similar mark that uses a mark after the senior 
user’s first use. See id. (“Junior users [are those] who subsequently use the same or similar mark on 
similar products or services . . . .”). 
 7. 170 F.3d at 461. The court defined “actual economic harm” as “lessening [the famous 
mark’s] former selling power as an advertising agent for its goods or services.” Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 10. Id. at 223. 
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only prove a “likelihood of dilution” in order to obtain relief under the 
FTDA.
11
  
Shortly after the Ringling Bros. decision, President Clinton signed the 
Trademark Amendments Act of 1999 (TAA),
12
 which gave the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) the power to grant administrative 
relief for trademark dilution.
13
 The TAA amended the FTDA, allowing a 
senior user to oppose
14
 or cancel
15
 registrations of marks that dilute the senior 
user’s mark.16 This Note examines the TAA, its legislative history, and their 
effect on the analysis of  “causes dilution” in the FTDA. 
Part II.A of this Note examines the history of trademark dilution from its 
inception to the enactment of the FTDA in 1995. Part II.B discusses the split 
between the federal courts of appeal regarding the interpretation of “causes 
dilution.” Part II.C examines the TAA and its legislative history. Part III 
discusses various trademark litigation processes. Part IV analyzes the 
Ringling Bros. and Nabisco standards using principles of statutory 
construction and policy arguments. Part V proposes a solution to the issues 
raised in Part IV, ultimately finding that the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board (TTAB)
17
 should apply a “likelihood of dilution” standard in an 
opposition or cancellation proceeding, and federal district courts should 
apply an “actual dilution” standard in section 43(c) proceedings.18 
 
 
 11. Id. at 224.  
 12. Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Congress enacted the TAA less than five months after the Ringling 
Bros. decision. Notably, the parties argued the Nabisco case prior to the TAA’s enactment, but the 
court decided the case less than a month after the enactment. 
 13. See infra notes 82-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of the TAA. 
 14. A senior user’s right to oppose a mark’s registration is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (Supp. 
V 1999). 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) provides in pertinent part:  
Any person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark upon the 
principal register, including as a result of dilution under section 1125(c) of this title, may, upon 
payment of the prescribed fee, file an opposition in the Patent and Trademark Office, stating the 
grounds therefore, within thirty days after the publication under subsection (a) of section 1062 of 
this title of the mark sought to be registered. 
Id. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 codifies a senior user’s right to cancel a mark’s registration. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1064 provides in pertinent part: 
A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating the grounds relied upon, may, upon payment 
of the prescribed fee, be filed as follows by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged, 
including as a result of dilution under section 1125(c) of this title, by the registration of a mark on 
the principal register established by this chapter . . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (Supp. V 1999). 
 16. Trademark Amendments Act, supra note 12, § 2 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063, 1064, 
1092). 
 17. See infra note 101. 
 18. Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act is codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). See infra notes 101-22 
and accompanying text for discussion of the trademark litigation process. 
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II. HISTORY  
A. Trademark Dilution: From Its Inception Through the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995.  
Frank Schechter introduced the concept of trademark dilution to the 
United States.
19
 Schechter believed that  
the ‘real injury’ caused by concurrent use of [junior marks identical or 
sufficiently similar to a “unique” senior mark] was not consumer 
confusion, but ‘the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity 
and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon 
non-competing goods.’20 
Schechter proposed that trademark law should prevent “the ‘dilution’ of truly 
‘unique’ marks identified as those employing ‘coined, arbitrary, or fanciful 
words or phrases that . . . from the very beginning, [have] been associated in 
the public mind with a particular product.’”21 
Although early attempts to incorporate dilution into the federal trademark 
statutes failed,
22
 many states enacted their own antidilution statutes.
23
 In 
1988, the Senate passed a trademark bill containing an antidilution 
 
 
 19. Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927), 
reprinted in 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334 (1970). See also, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey 
Combined Shows, Inc., 170 F.3d 449, 453-54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999) (noting the 
significance of Schechter’s work); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:67 (4th ed.) [hereinafter MCCARTHY] (same). 
 20. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 454 (quoting Schechter, supra note 19, at 825). 
 21. 170 F.3d at 454 (quoting Schechter, supra note 19, at 829). 
 22. Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 
CAL. L. REV. 439, 449-50 (1956). See also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 24:67. 
 23. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, §§ 24:80, 24:81. As of the mid-1990s, approximately twenty-
six states had statutes adopting the language of, or language substantially similar to, Section 12 of the 
1964 United States Trademark Association Model State Trademark Bill. Id. § 24:80. Section 12 
provides: 
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark 
registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at common law, 
shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the 
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services. 
Id. For further discussion of the Model Bill, see 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, §§ 22:8-22:10. In 1992, 
the United States (now International) Trademark Association revised the Model Bill, requiring that a 
mark be “famous” to fall under the dilution provisions’ protection. MCCARTHY, supra note 19, 
§ 24:81. In total, at least twenty-nine states had antidilution statutes at the signing of the FTDA in 
January, 1996. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis 
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 794 n.18 (1997); Brent G. Seitz, Note, The Actual 
Harm Requirement and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey 
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. 
113, 116 (1999). 
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provision.
24
 However, the House of Representatives opposed the provision,
25
 
and no antidilution provision appeared in the final version of the bill signed 
into law.
26
 It was not until December of 1995 when Congress passed the 
FTDA,
27
 which President Clinton signed into law on January 16, 1996, that 
dilution became incorporated into Federal Trademark Law.
28
 
The FTDA amended the Lanham Act, adding an antidilution provision to 
section 43(c).
29
 This section provides that the senior owner of a famous mark 
is entitled to an injunction
30
 against a junior user “if such use begins after the 
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the 
mark.”31 Congress listed eight factors that courts could consider when 
deciding if a mark is “distinctive and famous” and therefore protected by the 
FTDA.
32
 The statute defines dilution as “the lessening of the capacity of a 
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the 
 
 
 24. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. REP. ON S. 1883, S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 41-43 (1988), 
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5605. 
 25. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 24:86. 
 26. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 27. FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. V 
1999)). See also 141 CONG. REC. H14,317 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S38,561 (1995). 
 28. The FTDA passed through Congress without generating much legislative history. See 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMM. REP. ON S. 1883, S. REP. NO. 100-515 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577; 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 24:87. However, there are two sources that 
provide useful legislative history for the FTDA. Id. § 24:87 (citing U.S. Trademark Assoc. Trademark 
Rev. Comm’n. Rep. and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 
TRADEMARK REP. 375 (1987)).  
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 30. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (providing for injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (Supp. V 
1999)). 15 U.S.C. § 1116 provides:  
The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this capter shall have 
power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court 
may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in 
the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of 
section 1125 of this title. 
Id. 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. This section provides:  
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but 
not limited to—(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration 
and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is 
used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical 
extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or 
services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas 
and channels of trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction is 
sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) 
whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, 
or on the principal register.   
Id.  
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presence or absence of—(1) competition between the owner of the famous 
mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or 
deception.”33 The FTDA also provides for recovery of damages if the junior 
user “willfully intended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause 
dilution of the famous mark.”34 
B. Judicial Interpretations of the FTDA  
One of the first issues the judiciary faced under the FTDA was whether a 
plaintiff in a section 43(c) proceeding must prove actual dilution or merely 
proffer evidence sufficient to prove a likelihood of dilution.
35
 The Fourth 
Circuit first addressed this issue in Ringling Bros.
36
  
 
 
 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1999). Generally, courts and commentators interpret the FTDA to 
include both dilution by “blurring” and dilution by “tarnishment.” 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, 
§§ 24:94, 24:95. Dilution by “blurring” occurs when “[c]ustomers or prospective customers will see 
the plaintiff’s mark used by other persons to identify different sources on a plethora of different goods 
and services. The unique and distinctive significance of the mark to identify and distinguish one source 
may be diluted and weakened.” Id. § 24:68. See also id. §§ 24:100-24:103. Dilution by “tarnishment” 
occurs when “the effect of the defendant’s unauthorized use is to tarnish, degrade, or dilute the 
distinctive quality of the mark.” Id. § 24:69. See also id. §§ 24:104-24:107. 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2). This section provides for damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) and 15 
U.S.C. § 1118. Section 1117(a) provides:  
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark 
Office, a violation under section 1125(a), (c), or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 
1125(c) of this title, shall have been established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the 
plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and 
subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by 
the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. . . . If the court shall find that the amount of the 
recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter 
judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. 
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (Supp. V 1999). 
  Section 1118 provides:  
In any action arising under this chapter, in which a violation of any right of the registrant of a 
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) of this title, 
or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been established, the court may 
order that all labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, and advertisements in the 
possession of the defendant, bearing the registered mark or, in the case of a violation of section 
1125(a) of this title or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, the word, term, name, 
symbol, device, combination thereof, designation, description, or representation that is the subject 
of the violation, or any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation thereof, and all 
plates, molds, matrices, and other means of making the same, shall be delivered up and destroyed.  
Id. § 1118. 
 35. W. Whitaker Rayner, In Search of a Dilution Solution: Implementation of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act, 20 MISS. C. L. REV. 93, 96 (1999). 
 36. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 
F.3d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999). 
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1. The Ringling Bros. Decision 
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. (Ringling Bros.) 
filed a claim under the FTDA,
 37
 claiming that the Utah Division of Travel 
Development (Utah) diluted Ringling Bros.’s trademark slogan for circus 
productions, THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH (GREATEST SHOW 
mark), by making commercial use of the trademark slogan THE GREATEST 
SNOW ON EARTH (GREATEST SNOW mark) for advertising the state’s 
winter sports attractions.
38
 The district court found that neither survey 
evidence
39
 nor a six-factor balancing test
40
 supported a finding that Utah’s 
mark diluted Ringling Bros.’s mark. Ringling Bros. appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit, challenging the district court’s finding that Utah’s mark did not 
dilute Ringling Bros.’s mark in violation of the FTDA.41 Specifically, 
Ringling Bros. challenged “the district court’s interpretation of the statutory 
meaning of ‘dilution’; the court’s rejection of [Ringling Bros.’s] survey 
evidence as insufficient to prove ‘dilution’; and the court’s rejection of 
[Ringling Bros.’s] dilution claim under a [balancing test] analysis.”42 On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that, at trial, “Ringling put on essentially 
undisputed evidence demonstrating that its mark achieved ‘famous’ status 
before [the] Utah Division of Travel Development began use of its mark.” 43 
 
 
 37. Id. at 451. Ringling Bros. filed suit against Utah on June 6, 1996, asking for both injunctive 
and monetary relief. Id. at 452. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. 
Supp. 605, 616-18 (E.D. Va. 1997). In its Findings of Fact, the district court described in some detail 
Ringling Bros.’s consumer survey. Id. at 612. The district court concluded that “Ringling’s survey 
evidence [did] not demonstrate that Utah’s mark lessens the capacity of THE GREATEST SHOW ON 
EARTH to identify and distinguish the Circus in Utah.” Id. at 618. 
 40. Id. at 618-22. The district court applied a six-factor balancing test taken from a Second 
Circuit case that analyzed the New York state antidilution statute. See id. at 618 (citing Mead Data 
Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., 
concurring)). The six Mead factors include the following: “(i) the similarity of the marks, (ii) the 
similarity of the products or services covered by the marks, (iii) the sophistication of consumers, (iv) 
predatory intent, (v) renown of the senior mark, and (vi) renown of the junior mark.” Id. The district 
court balanced these factors, concluding that “notwithstanding the fame of the marks in Utah, a 
balancing of the Mead Data factors does not demonstrate that Utah’s mark will likely lessen the 
capacity of THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH to distinguish or identify Ringling’s circus.” 955 F. 
Supp. at 618-22. 
 41. 170 F.3d at 452. Additionally, Ringling Bros. challenged the district court’s denial of their 
demand for a jury trial. Id. 
 42. Id. at 453. For discussion of the district court’s findings regarding the survey evidence and 
the balancing test analysis, see supra notes 39-40, respectively. The Fourth Circuit affirmed “the 
district court’s assessment that the consumer survey evidence does not support a finding of dilution 
under the federal Act.” 170 F.3d at 463. Furthermore, the court concluded that the Mead balancing test 
“simply is not appropriate for assessing a claim under the federal Act.” Id. at 464.  
 43. Id. at 451-52. Specifically, the district court found the following: Ringling Bros. had used the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/4
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Thus, the only remaining dispositive issue was whether the GREATEST 
SNOW mark diluted the GREATEST SHOW mark.
44
  
The court ultimately concluded that  
to establish dilution of a famous mark under the [FTDA] requires 
proof that (1) a defendant has made use of a junior mark sufficiently 
similar to the famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of 
consumers a mental association of the two that (2) has caused (3) 
actual economic harm to the famous mark’s economic value by 
lessening its former selling power as an advertising agent for its goods 
or services.
45
 
After an in-depth analysis of both Frank Schechter’s dilution proposals46 and 
the state antidilution statutes,
47
 the court found that “‘dilution’ under the state 
statutes involved, as an essential element, some form of harm to the protected 
mark’s selling power—its economic value—resulting otherwise than by 
consumer confusion from the junior mark’s use.”48 The Fourth Circuit then 
 
 
GREATEST SHOW slogan since 1872, and they received a federal registration for the mark in 1961 
for entertainment services in the nature of a circus. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D. Va. 1997). The Ringling Bros. 
circus travels throughout the United States and performs approximately 1,000 shows annually to 
nearly twelve million people in ninety-five cities. Id. Annually, the circus exposes over seventy million 
people to the GREATEST SHOW mark.  Id. In the fiscal year ending in January, 1997, Ringling Bros. 
generated revenues of more than $103 million from goods and services bearing or using the 
GREATEST SHOW mark, while they spent approximately $19 million on advertising using the mark. 
Id. at 609-10.  
 As early as 1962, the Utah Division of Travel Development, an agency of the State of Utah, began 
using the GREATEST SNOW mark in connection with tourism services. Id. at 611. Utah registered 
the GREATEST SNOW mark with the State of Utah in 1975 and renewed the registration in 1985 and 
1995. Id. In 1988, Utah applied for a federal registration with the USPTO. Id. Ringling Bros. opposed 
Utah’s application, but the USPTO granted Utah’s registration on January 21, 1997. Id. 
 44. 170 F.3d at 452. 
 45. Id. at 461 (emphasis added).  
 46. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.  
 47. See supra note 23. The court found that although the state statutes varied significantly, they 
typically had the following four features in common:  
(1) they defined the category of marks protected against dilution solely by reference to their 
“distinctive quality”; (2) they proscribed not just actual, consummated dilution, but the “likelihood 
of dilution”; (3) by containing no express reference to harm to the senior mark’s economic value, 
they defined dilution in terms susceptible to the interpretation that it consisted solely of a loss of 
the mark’s distinctiveness; and (4) they provided only injunctive relief. 
170 F.3d at 454. 
 48. Id. at 458. However, because a plaintiff must prove only a “likelihood of dilution” under the 
state statutes, the state courts have not had to define this “economic harm.” Id.  
Instead, looking only to the likelihood of such a speculative future condition, the [state] courts 
have either (1) assumed that [dilution’s] essential elements—mental association, causation, 
harm—could be found (or rejected) as fact by inference from a balancing of the “Mead factors,” 
or (2) assumed that all those elements could be conclusively presumed—direct or indirect proof 
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contrasted the FTDA with the state statutes, concluding that the FTDA 
“proscribes and provides remedy only for actual, consummated dilution and 
not for the mere ‘likelihood of dilution’ proscribed by the state statutes.”49 
The court conceded that proving actual dilution “by the ordinary processes of 
advocacy” would be difficult,50 but stated that “[p]roof will be difficult, 
because actual, consummated dilutive harm and its cause are difficult 
concepts.”51 
The Fifth Circuit and a number of district courts followed the Ringling 
Bros. case, holding that plaintiffs must show actual economic harm in order 
to obtain relief under section 43(c).
52
 In Westchester Media v. PRL USA 
Holdings, Inc.,
53
 the Fifth Circuit “endorse[d] the Fourth Circuit’s holding 
that the FTDA requires proof of actual harm since this standard best accords 
with the plain meaning of the statute.”54  
 
 
being impossible—simply from proof of the identity or near-identity of the two marks. 
Id. 
 49. Id. The court noted that “[u]nlike the state antidilution statutes which provide only injunctive 
relief, reflecting their sole focus on prevention of future harm, the [FTDA] provides that where willful 
conduct is shown, both compensatory and restitutionary relief may be awarded—for necessarily 
consummated economic harm.” Id. at 461. The court added that “in the face of the obvious centrality 
of ‘likelihood of dilution’ provisions in the interpretation and application of state antidilution statutes 
for the fifty years of their existence, the [FTDA] does not so provide.” Id. Additionally, the court 
found that the FTDA explicitly prescribes that a mark’s selling power is the end harm at which the 
FTDA is aimed, not the “distinctiveness” of the mark. Id. at 458. The court rejected Ringling Bros.’s 
arguments, observing that (1) protecting the mark’s “distinctiveness” would create a property-right-in-
gross in famous trademarks, which the court found to be outside of Congress’s intent and (2) allowing 
judicial presumption of cause and harm to economic status is inconsistent with the language of the 
FTDA. Id. at 459. For a more detailed analysis of the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the FTDA, see 
Seitz, supra note 23, at 124-32. 
 50. 170 F.3d at 464. 
 51. Id. The court gave three examples as to how a senior user could prove “actual, consummated 
dilutive harm.” Id. at 464-65. These are as follows: (1) “proof of an actual loss of revenues, and proof 
of replicating use as cause by disproving other possible causes,” Id. at 465, (2) a “skillfully constructed 
consumer survey designed not just to demonstrate ‘mental association’ of the marks in isolation, but 
further consumer impressions from which actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred,” Id., and 
(3) “indirect evidence that might complement other proof,” such as “relevant contextual factors such as 
the extent of the junior mark’s exposure, the similarity of the marks, the firmness of the senior mark’s 
hold.” Id. For further discussion of methods of proving dilution under the FTDA, see Patrick M. Bible, 
Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: 
Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 295 (1999). 
 52. See Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000); HQM, 
Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Md. 1999); People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. 
Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 55 F. 
Supp. 2d 1070, 1075 (C.D. Cal.), aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Am. 
Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (D.N.J. 1999); World Gym Licensing, 
Ltd. v. Fitness World, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 614 (D. Md. 1999). 
 53. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 54. Id. at 670. The court elaborated: 
Whereas state antidilution statutes incorporate, often expressly, the ‘likelihood of dilution’ 
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2. The Nabisco Decision 
In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
55
 the Second Circuit explicitly 
rejected the Ringling Bros. analysis, concluding that a party need not show 
“actual, consummated” dilution in order to obtain relief under the FTDA.56 In 
this case, Nabisco, Inc. filed a complaint against PF Brands, Inc. (Pepperidge 
Farm) seeking a declaratory judgment that its product did not violate any of 
Pepperidge Farm’s trademark rights.57 Pepperidge Farm filed a counterclaim 
against Nabisco for federal trademark infringement and dilution, as well as 
state-law dilution and unfair competition.
58
 The district court found in favor 
of Pepperidge Farm, granting a preliminary injunction on the federal and 
state dilution claims, but denying relief under the trademark infringement and 
unfair competition claims.
59
 Nabisco appealed, challenging the district 
court’s use of a “likelihood of dilution” standard.60  
 
 
standard, the federal statute does not. Instead, it prohibits any commercial use of a famous mark 
that ‘causes dilution.’ Both the present tense of the verb and the lack of any modification of 
‘dilution’ support an actual harm standard. Several persuasive contextual indicators were also 
pointed out by the Fourth Circuit [in the Ringling Bros. case]. For instance, the conduct proscribed 
under the FTDA is ‘another person’s . . . use,’ not merely threatened use of the mark. In addition, 
‘unlike the state antidilution statutes which provide only injunctive relief, reflecting their sole 
focus on the prevention of future harm, the federal Act provides that where willful conduct is 
shown, compensatory and restitutionary relief may be awarded—for necessarily consummated 
economic harm. 
Id. at 670-71 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). Moreover, the court stated that “in the absence 
of any authority stating that Congress intended a ‘likelihood of dilution’ standard for the FTDA, [it] 
may not depart from the plain meaning of the statute.” Id. at 671. 
 55. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 56. Id. at 223-25. 
 57. Id. at 213. The Second Circuit found the following: Pepperidge Farm had produced small 
goldfish-shaped crackers since 1962. Id. at 212. Pepperidge Farm produced these crackers in a variety 
of flavors and packages, although the primary product was a cheddar cheese-flavored cracker sold in a 
bag or box under the trade name “Goldfish.” Id. Pepperidge Farm held numerous federal trademark 
registrations for the Goldfish line of products. Id. Between 1995 and 1998, the company spent more 
than $120 million marketing the product worldwide, and in the same time period the company enjoyed 
net sales of $200 million per year. Id. at 212-13. At the time of the suit, Goldfish was the second-
largest selling cheese cracker by sales volume and the top-selling cheese cracker by sales dollars. Id. at 
213. In 1998, Nabisco entered into an agreement that gave Nabisco the right to make cheese crackers 
in shapes based on CatDog, a cartoon produced by the Nickelodeon Television Network. Id. In any 
given package of these crackers, Nabisco produced one-quarter in the shape of a fish that “closely 
resemble[d] Pepperidge Farm’s goldfish cracker in color, shape, and size, and taste.” Id. at 213. After 
Pepperidge Farm executives first saw a sample of Nabisco’s product, they wrote a cease-and-desist 
letter to Nabisco, protesting the goldfish-shaped cracker that Nabisco intended to produce. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 214. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(finding that “[a] showing of a likelihood of dilution . . . will establish irreparable harm under Section 
43(c)”). In addition to challenging the district court’s dilution standard, Nabisco argued the following: 
(1) Pepperidge Farm failed to show likelihood of success in proving dilution, because, in the 
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The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary 
injunction.
61
 After explicitly rejecting the Ringling Bros. standard,
62
 the court 
further analyzed the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions.63 The court noted that it 
was unclear which of the following two positions the Fourth Circuit adopted: 
(1) a narrow position requiring a court to infer dilution only from “actual loss 
of revenues” or a “skillfully constructed consumer survey,” and not from 
“contextual factors (degree of mark and product similarity, etc.)”;64 or (2) a 
broader position requiring “not only that dilution be proved by a showing of 
lost revenues or surveys but also that the junior be already established in the 
marketplace before the senior could seek an injunction.”65  
The Nabisco court disagreed with both positions. The Second Circuit 
argued that the first position was “an arbitrary and unwarranted limitation on 
the methods of proof”66 and that “[e]ven if diminished revenue could be 
shown, it would be extraordinarily speculative and difficult to prove that the 
loss was due to the dilution of the mark.”67 Furthermore, the court stated that 
consumer surveys were “expensive, time-consuming and not immune to 
manipulation.”68 The court conceded that the language of the FTDA 
minimally supported the second position, in that the statute uses the terms 
“causes dilution” as opposed to “likelihood of dilution.”69 However, the court 
countered that “such a reading depends on excessive literalism to defeat the 
intent of the statute,”70 and that it “seems plausibly within Congress’s 
meaning to understand the statute as intending to provide for an injunction to 
prevent the harm before it occurs.”71 The court reasoned that, under the 
 
 
market context (a) consumers would not associate the two products, and (b) Nabisco’s mark was 
not substantially similar to Pepperidge Farm’s; (2) the antidilution statutes were adopted to protect 
against dilution by the use of a similar mark on a non-competing product and do not apply to 
trademarks on competing products, which are governed instead by the infringement standard; (3) 
Nabisco’s use of a fish is not a “trademark use” and is thus not actionable under the antidilution 
statutes; (4) dilution cannot be found without documentation of actual injury, consisting of an 
actual reduction in the senior mark’s selling power. 
191 F.3d at 214. 
 61. 191 F.3d at 229. 
 62. Id. at 223 (“We reject the argument [that proof of dilution under the FTDA requires proof of 
an ‘actual, consummated harm’] because we disagree with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
statute.”). However, the court did agree with the Fourth Circuit’s holding that “the dilution statutes do 
not create a ‘property right in gross.’” Id. at 224 n.6. 
 63. Id. at 223-24. 
 64. Id. at 223 (quoting Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 457, 464-65). 
 65. 191 F.3d at 224. 
 66. Id. at 223. 
 67. Id. at 224.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. (citing Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464). 
 70. 191 F.3d at 224. 
 71. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/4
   
 
 
 
 
 
2001] “CAUSES DILUTION” CAUSING PROBLEMS 1171 
 
 
 
 
Fourth Circuit’s position, the senior user could not receive relief until injury 
had actually occurred, and absent willfulness (thereby triggering damages), 
the senior user could never be compensated for that injury.
72
 In addition, the 
junior user would be “unable to seek declaratory relief before going to 
market,”73 forcing that party to spend large sums of money with no 
“assurance that their mark will not be enjoined.”74 The court concluded that 
regardless of which position the Ringling Bros. court took, the statute 
permitted “adjudication granting or denying an injunction, whether at the 
instance of the senior user or the junior seeking declaratory relief, before the 
dilution has actually occurred.”75 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits followed the Nabisco decision, holding 
that Congress requires a plaintiff to show only a “likelihood of dilution” in a 
section 43(c) action.
76
 In V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,
77
 the Sixth 
Circuit “conclude[d] that the Nabisco test both tracks the language of the 
statute and follows more closely Congress’s intent in enacting the FTDA.”78 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,
79
 the Seventh Circuit “side[d] 
with the Second Circuit and [held] that proof of a mere ‘likelihood of 
dilution’ is sufficient to satisfy the ‘causes dilution’ element of a [plaintiff’s] 
case.”80 In addition, the Third Circuit implicitly followed the Nabisco 
 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 224-25. However, the court noted that following the Ringling Bros. decision would not 
help Nabisco “because the district court found violation of both the federal and the New York State 
antidilution statutes, and the latter expressly applies to ‘[l]ikelihood of injury . . . or of dilution.’” Id. at 
225 n.7 (citation omitted). 
 76. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), petition for cert. filed, 70 
U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2002)(No. 01-1015); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 
456 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 77. 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 78. Id. at 475. Although the court found the Fourth Circuit’s arguments “somewhat persuasive,” 
id., the court found that Congress intended the FTDA to have a broad reach. Id. The court quoted from 
the FTDA’s legislative history and stated that “it evinces an intent to provide a broad remedy for the 
lesser trademark violation of dilution and recognizes that the essence of the dilution claim is a property 
right in the ‘potency’ of a mark.” Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1032). Furthermore, the court found that by stating that “‘dilution is an infection, 
which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark’—[Congress] 
evince[d] an intent to allow a remedy before dilution has actually caused economic harm to the senior 
mark.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-374) (emphasis in original). 
 79. 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 80. Id. at 468. The court’s reasoning essentially mirrored the Second Circuit’s reasoning in 
Nabisco. The Eli Lilly court stated that requiring proof of actual economic harm “would subject senior 
mark holders to uncompensable injury.” Id. at 467. “By the time plaintiffs were permitted to file suit, 
moreover, junior mark holders might have the defense that the senior mark had lost its distinctiveness 
due to the numerous other marks that have copied it.” Id. at 467-68. Furthermore, the court stated that 
the “actual dilution” standard would make it impossible for junior users to seek a declaratory judgment 
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decision.
81
 
C. The Trademark Amendments Act of 1999  
Congress enacted the TAA in the summer of 1999.
82
 The TAA amended 
various sections of the Lanham Act,
83
 in part allowing senior users to use 
dilution as grounds for opposing
84
 or canceling
85
 a trademark registration 
before the TTAB.
86
  
The House of Representatives first introduced the TAA as House Bill 
1565.
87
 At a hearing on the bill, Howard Coble, Chairperson of the House 
 
 
that their mark does not dilute another’s mark before entering the market. Id. at 468. Finally, the court 
stated that the “actual dilution” standard “holds plaintiffs to an impossible level of proof.” Id. 
 81. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 179 n.11 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (Barry, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority’s implicit holding that “the District Court did 
not err in finding that irreparable injury may be shown even in the absence of actual economic harm, 
presumably siding with the Second Circuit and rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s position on the issue”), 
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 760 (2001). Note also that the Ninth Circuit apparently adopted a “likelihood 
of dilution” standard prior to the Nabisco decision. In Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 
868 (9th Cir. 1999), the court stated that 
injunctive relief is available under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act if a plaintiff can establish 
that (1) its mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making commercial use of the mark in commerce; 
(3) the defendant’s use began after the plaintiff’s mark became famous; and (4) the defendant’s 
use presents a likelihood of dilution of the distinctive value of the mark.  
Id. at 873-74. However, the Avery Dennison court did not discuss the standard in detail. Id. 
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed a district court ruling that favorably cited the Fourth 
Circuit’s Ringling Bros. holding. See Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 
1070, 1075 (C.D. Cal.), aff’d, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision). 
 82. Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See also 145 CONG. REC. D953 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1999); 145 CONG. 
REC. H6,363-64 (daily ed. July 26, 1999); 145 CONG. REC. S8,191 (daily ed. July 1, 1999). The House 
of Representatives first introduced the TAA as H.R. 1565 on April 27, 1999. 145 CONG. REC. H2,371 
(daily ed. Apr. 27, 1999). The House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property held a hearing 
on this bill on May 5, 1999. 145 CONG. REC. D487 (daily ed. May 5, 1999). For discussion of this 
hearing, see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text. The Senate introduced Senate Bill 1259, a bill 
virtually identical to House Bill 1565, on June 22, 1999. 145 CONG. REC. S7,452-04 (daily ed. June 22, 
1999). The Senate bill became the TAA. 145 CONG. REC. D953 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1999). 
 83. Section 2 of the TAA amended the opposition and cancellation sections. Section 3 dealt with 
the remedies in cases of dilution of famous marks, explicitly providing for injunctive relief under 15 
U.S.C. § 1116 in dilution cases. In section 4 the United States waived its sovereign immunity in 
trademark infringement and dilution cases. Section 5 detailed the burden of proof for plaintiffs suing 
for trade dress infringement. Finally, section 6 consisted of several technical amendments. TAA, 113 
Stat. at 218-20. 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (Supp. V 1999). For text of this section, see supra note 14. 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (Supp. V 1999). For text of this section, see supra note 15.  
 86. Prior to the enactment of PL 106-43, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that the 
FTDA did not provide a statutory ground for opposition or cancellation. See Babson Bros. Co. v. 
Surge Power Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1953 (T.T.A.B. 1996). For a discussion of the trademark litigation 
process, see infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text. 
 87. H.R. 1565, 106th Cong. (1999). See also 145 CONG. REC. H2,371 (daily ed. April 27, 1999). 
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Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, stated that Congress had 
adopted an “actual dilution” standard in the FTDA.88 He stated that the 
FTDA  
provides for injunctive relief after an identical or similar mark has 
been in use and has caused actual dilution of a famous mark but 
provides no means to oppose an application for a mark or to cancel a 
registered mark that will result in dilution of the holder’s famous 
mark.
89
 
Furthermore, Representative Coble stated that as a result of the Babson 
Bros. v. Surge Power Corp.
90
 decision, “the holder of a famous mark must 
wait for actual harm from dilution in order to seek a remedy through the 
federal courts.”91 Other witnesses at the hearing echoed Representative 
Coble’s interpretation of the FTDA.92 
 
 
 88. Hearing on H.R. 1565 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of the Honorable Howard 
Coble, Chairman). Statements of committee members are valuable in determining legislative intent. 
See NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48:10, at 453 (6th ed. 2000) 
[hereinafter SUTHERLAND] (“Because records of committee hearings are distributed to members of 
Congress, it is assumed they had knowledge of these statements and of the evils described. Passage of 
the proposed bill is evidence of their intent to remedy these evils.”).  
 89. Hearings, supra note 88, at 1 (statement of the Honorable Howard Coble). 
 90. 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1953 (T.T.A.B. 1996). 
 91. Hearing, supra note 88, at 1 (statement of the Honorable Howard Coble). Mr. Coble added 
that 
H.R. 1565 would provide holders of famous marks with a right to oppose or seek cancellation of a 
mark that would cause dilution. This amendment will meet the important policy objectives of a 
more timely and inexpensive resolution of the dilution issue, and result in greater certainty in the 
application of this body of trademark law. 
Id.  
 92. One witness stated that House Bill 1565  
would allow the issue of dilution to be addressed much earlier in the process, especially in the case 
of an intent-to-use application, than is possible under the Babson decision. It is illogical to 
withhold relief from a trademark owner against the registration of a diluting mark until after the 
mark is registered. 
Hearing, supra note 88, at 8-9 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American 
Intellectual Property Law Association). Discussing the impact of the Ringling Bros. case, Mr. Kirk 
added that although the “actual dilution” standard might encourage trademark holders to bring more 
state and common law actions, “they will not be able to do so if the alleged dilutor has obtained a 
federal registration” because of section 43(c)(3) of the Lanham Act. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) 
(Supp. V 1999)). This section provides that a person may not bring a state dilution action against the 
owner of a federally registered mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). Another witness stated that  
[a]llowing the parties [in a dilution dispute] to resolve the issue early in the process—in the case of 
intent to use applications, perhaps before use even commences[—]benefits both parties. A finding 
of dilution by the TTAB might well cause the applicant to select a different mark prior to 
investment of substantial funds, and certainly would give fair notice of the risks involved in going 
forward. 
Hearing, supra note 88, at 17 (statement of Kimbley L. Muller, Vice President for Trademark Affairs 
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The House Report on House Bill 1565
93
 also evidences Congress’s intent 
regarding the “causes dilution” requirement of the FTDA.94 The report stated 
unequivocally that the FTDA “provides for injunctive relief after the 
identical or similar mark has been in use and has caused actual dilution of a 
famous mark.”95 The report stated that House Bill 1565 would allow 
trademark owners to oppose or cancel a registration, thereby alleviating these 
problems.
96
  
The Senate was equally explicit in its approval of the “actual dilution” 
standard. In his introductory remarks on Senate Bill 1259,
97
 Senator Orrin 
Hatch, the co-sponsor of the bill, stated that “under current law a trademark 
 
 
and Policies, International Trademark Association). See also Hearing, supra note 88, at 23 (statement 
of Garo A. Partoyan, Chairman, Trademark Commmittee of the Intellectual Property Owners 
Association). Although courts do not give as much weight to statements made by interested parties at 
committee hearings as those made by committee members, they may use these statements to determine 
legislative intent. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 88, § 48:10, at 454-55. See also Lawrence County v. 
Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 264-65 (1985). Specifically, courts may accord 
statements of interested parties some weight “where statements of interested parties urge changes in 
the proposed bill because of certain assumed interpretation.” 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 88, § 48:10, 
at 455. See also, e.g., Suckowski v. Norton, 16 F. Supp. 677, 678 (E.D. Penn. 1935). But see, e.g., 
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986). In the hearing on House Bill 1565, the parties who testified did 
so assuming that the Ringling Bros. “actual dilution” standard was the interpretation that the federal 
courts would apply. 
 93. H.R. REP. NO. 106-250, at 6 (1999). 
 94. “Although comments about an earlier act in a legislative committee report on a subsequent 
bill are not part of the legislative history of the earlier act and therefore have less probative force than 
legislative history, they are entitled to consideration as an expert opinion concerning its proper 
interpretation.” 2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 88, § 49:11, at 126-27. See also Sioux Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. of New 
England, 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1140 n.18 (D. Conn. 1980) (“[A subsequent report] is entitled to 
considerable weight as a kind of ‘expert opinion’ concerning the meaning and proper interpretation of 
the statute, especially in view of Congress’ contemporaneous silence on the question at issue here.”). 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 106-250, at 5 (1999). The report added that the FTDA “provides no means to 
oppose an application for a mark or to cancel a registered mark that will result in dilution of the 
holder’s famous mark.” Id.  
 96. Id. at 5-6. Furthermore, the report stated the following:  
Resolution of the dilution issue before the [TTAB], as opposed to Federal District Court, would 
result in more timely, economical, and expeditious decisions. Resolving the issue at the [TTAB] 
would provide certainty to competing trademark interests, before the applicant has invested 
significant resources in its proposed mark, and before dilution-type damage has been suffered in 
the marketplace by the owner of the famous mark. Also, the [TTAB] would give guidance to 
litigants and the Trademark Bar, through precedent, with respect to such issues as what qualifies 
as a “famous” mark, and what constitutes dilution, whether by blurring or tarnishment. Enactment 
of [this bill] meets the important policy objectives of a more timely and inexpensive resolution of 
the dilution issue, and will result in greater certainty in the application of this body of trademark 
law. 
Id. 
 97. S. 1259, 106th Cong. (1999). See also 145 CONG. REC. S7,452-56 (daily ed. June 22, 1999). 
Senate Bill 1259 was virtually identical to House Bill 1565. See 145 CONG. REC. H6,363-64 (daily ed. 
July 26, 1999) (statement of the Honorable Howard Coble). 
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owner may seek relief under the federal dilution statute only after dilution of 
the mark has occurred,”98 adding that the new law would allow trademark 
owners “to prevent trademark dilution before it occurs”99 by allowing for 
opposition or cancellation before the TTAB.
100
 
III. OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK LITIGATION PROCESS 
A trademark holder may initiate the adjudication of trademark disputes in 
two primary forums: before the TTAB
101
 and in federal district court.
102
 This 
section outlines the litigation process for a trademark holder seeking to 
protect its mark from dilution or for a junior user seeking a declaratory 
judgment that its mark does not dilute the senior user’s mark. 
 
 
 98. 145 CONG. REC. S7,452-54 (daily ed. June 22, 1999). Senator Hatch added that 
at least one circuit has held that likelihood of dilution is not enough, the trademark owner must 
prove actual dilution. The result is that the owner of a famous mark must stand idly by throughout 
the registration process and await recourse through costly litigation in federal court only after he 
has suffered harm to his mark. By specifically allowing the trademark owner to oppose 
registration or to petition for cancellation of a diluting mark, the bill . . . will prevent needless 
harm to the goodwill and distinctiveness of many trademarks and will make enforcing the federal 
dilution statute less costly and time consuming for all involved. 
Id. Senator Leahy, the co-sponsor of Senate Bill 1259, concurred, stating that the bill “would permit 
the trademark owner to oppose registration or to petition for cancellation of a diluting mark, and 
thereby prevent needless harm to the goodwill and distinctiveness of many trademarks and make 
enforcing the Federal dilution statute less costly and time consuming for all involved.” Id. at S7,456. 
In his remarks on Senate Bill 1259 in the House, Representative Cummings also agreed, stating that 
“[t]he legislation enacted in the 105th Congress authorizes injunctive relief after the harm has 
occurred.” 145 CONG. REC. H6,363-64 (daily ed. July 26, 1999). Courts may infer congressional intent 
from statements made by a bill’s sponsor “where the statement is consistent with the statutory 
language and other legislative history.” 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 88, § 48:15, at 476-77. See also 
N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) (“Although the statements of one 
legislator made during debate may not be controlling, [the remarks of the bill’s sponsor are] an 
authoritative guide to the statute’s construction.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. In his remarks on Senate Bill 1259 in the House, Representative Cummings stated that 
“[t]he legislation enacted in the 105th Congress authorizes injunctive relief after the harm has 
occurred.” 145 CONG. REC. H6,363-64 (daily ed. July 26, 1999). 
 101. The TTAB is an administrative tribunal that both adjudicates challenges to federal trademark 
registration and hears appeals of refusals to register trademarks. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, 
§§ 20:99, 21:1. Although proceedings before the TTAB are not technically “litigation,” hereinafter 
“litigation” will include TTAB proceedings. 
 102. An applicant for federal registration may also initiate litigation if an examining attorney with 
the USPTO refuses to register the mark. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1071(a)(1), 1071(b)(1) (Supp. V 
1999). However, the USPTO may not refuse registration based on dilution. See U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, EXAMINATION GUIDE NO. 1-99, § VIII, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/notices/guide199.htm (September 29, 1999) (“The [TAA] has 
no effect on the examination process. Examining attorneys should not issue a refusal of registration 
under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), on the ground that the mark sought to 
be registered dilutes a registered mark.”). 
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A. Opposition and Cancellation 
If a senior user believes that a junior user’s mark is diluting its mark, the 
senior user may initiate an “inter partes”103 proceeding against the junior user 
if the junior user either (1) owns a federally registered mark or (2) is applying 
for federal registration of a mark.
104
 The FTDA, as amended by the TAA, 
allows a senior user to either (1) file an opposition with the USPTO,
105
 or (2) 
petition the USPTO to cancel the junior user’s registration.106 The TTAB has 
the exclusive power to adjudicate opposition and cancellation proceedings.
107
 
After a senior user files an opposition, the TTAB may refuse to register the 
junior user’s trademark if that mark would damage “any person . . . as a 
result of dilution under section 1125(c).”108 Additionally, the FTDA 
authorizes the TTAB to cancel
109
 a registered mark, “which when used 
would cause dilution under section 1125(c) of this title.”110 
 
 
 103. According to Professor McCarthy, “[i]n inter partes cases, the conflict is between applicants, 
between an applicant and an opposer, or between a registrant and a petitioner for cancellation. Such 
inter partes cases are heard in the first instance by the [TTAB] sitting as a fact-finding decision-
maker.” 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 21:1. Inter partes proceedings include opposition proceedings, 
cancellation proceedings, concurrent use proceedings, and interference proceedings. Id. § 20.99. See 
id. §§ 20:1-20:6 (Opposition); §§ 20:40-20:45 (Cancellation); § 20:81 (Concurrent Use); §§ 20:89-
20:93 (Interference). “In ex parte cases, the [TTAB] acts as an administrative appellate body reviewing 
final decisions of a Trademark Examiner as to registration. Ex parte cases are those in which the 
conflict arises between an applicant for registration and the [USPTO], which acts as a representative of 
the public.” Id. at § 21:1. Ex parte cases will not arise in the dilution context because the USPTO will 
not refuse registration based on dilution. See supra note 102.  
 104. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063(a), 1064 (Supp. V 1999). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (Supp. V 1999). See supra note 14 for the text of this section. See also 
37 C.F.R. §§ 2.101-2.107 (2000) (detailing procedures for filing opposition). 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (Supp. V 1999) (describing cancellation for marks on the primary register); 
15 U.S.C. § 1092 (Supp. V 1999) (describing cancellation for marks on the secondary register). See 
also 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.111-2.115 (2000) (detailing procedures for filing petition for cancellation). 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (Supp. V 1999). This section provides:  
(a) In every case of interference, opposition to registration, application to register as a lawful 
concurrent user, or application to cancel the registration of a mark, the Director shall give notice to 
all parties and shall direct a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to determine and decide the 
respective rights of registration. (b) The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board shall include the 
Director, the Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative 
trademark judges who are appointed by the Director. 
Id. 
 108. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a). This section provides that “[a]ny person who believes that he would be 
damaged by the registration of a mark upon the principal register, including as a result of dilution 
under section 1125(c) of this title, may . . . file an opposition in the Patent and Trademark Office.” Id. 
If the TTAB finds for the senior user, the USPTO may refuse to register the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 
(Supp. V 1999) (“A mark which when used would cause dilution under section 1125(c) of this title 
may be refused registration only pursuant to a proceeding brought under section 1063 of this title.”). 
 109. 15 U.S.C. § 1064. See supra note 15 for the text of this section. 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (Supp. V 1999) (“A registration for a mark which when used would cause 
dilution under section 1125(c) of this title may be canceled pursuant to a proceeding brought under 
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A party to an inter partes proceeding who is dissatisfied with the TTAB’s 
decision has the following two options: (1) appeal to the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit (CAFC);
111
 or (2) file a civil action in a federal district 
court.
112
 However, both parties must consent to the filing of an appeal to the 
CAFC.
113
 There are advantages and disadvantages to either approach.
114
 If 
both parties elect to appeal to the CAFC, no new evidence is permitted
115
 and 
the appellant cannot raise new issues on appeal that were not previously 
before the TTAB.
116
 Parties to a civil action in federal district court may 
include additional claims,
117
 but so may the opposing parties.
118
 In a civil 
action, the district court “serves in a dual capacity,”119 sitting as “both 
appellate reviewer of the facts found by the [TTAB], as well as a fact-finder 
based on new evidence introduced in the district court.”120 
 
 
either section 1064 of this title or section 1092 of this title.”). 
 111. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999). This section provides in pertinent part: 
[A] party to an opposition proceeding . . . [or] a party to a cancellation proceeding . . . who is 
dissatisfied with the decision of the . . . Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, may appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit thereby waiving his right to proceed under 
subsection (b) of this section: Provided, That such appeal shall be dismissed if any adverse party 
to the proceeding, other than the Director, shall, within twenty days after the appellant has filed 
notice of appeal . . . files notice with the Director that he elects to have all further proceedings 
conducted as provided in subsection (b) of this section . . . . 
Id. 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1). This section provides in pertinent part:  
Whenever a person authorized by subsection (a) of this section to appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is dissatisfied with the decision of the Director or 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, said person may, unless appeal has been taken to said United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, have remedy by a civil action if commenced 
within such time after such decision, not less than sixty days, as the Director appoints or as 
provided in subsection (a) of this section. The court may adjudge that an applicant is entitled to a 
registration upon the application involved, that a registration involved should be canceled, or such 
other matter as the issues in the proceeding require, as the facts in the case may appear . . . . 
Id. 
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1). See also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, §§ 21:10; 21:20. 
 114. See Gillette Co. v. “42” Products, Ltd., 435 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1970) (“Congress gave 
alternative remedies because each possessed its own unique advantages.”). 
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4). See also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 21:16. 
 116. See Hoover Co. v. Royal Appliance Mfg. Co., 238 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See also 
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 21:16. 
 117. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 21:20 (“An additional advantage of appeal to a federal 
district court is that the case can be expanded to include a prayer for injunctive relief for trademark 
infringement.”). 
 118. See, e.g., Fuller Prods. Co. v. Fuller Brush Co., 299 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1962). See also 3 
MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 21:20. 
 119. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 21:20. 
 120. Id. See also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164 (1999). 
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B. Civil Action in District Court Under Section 43(c) 
A senior user may also bring a civil action in federal district court against 
a junior user under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.
121
 A senior user may 
bring an action under this section regardless of whether or not its mark is 
registered.
122
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The “Likelihood of Dilution” Standard 
The TTAB should apply a “likelihood of dilution” standard when 
adjudicating inter partes proceedings. First, the language of the FTDA, as 
amended by the TAA, supports a “likelihood of dilution” standard in inter 
partes proceedings. Second, the legislative history of the TAA clearly 
supports applying a “likelihood of dilution” standard in TTAB opposition 
and cancellation proceedings. Finally, several policy reasons support the 
application of a “likelihood of dilution” standard in inter partes proceedings. 
1. Language of the Statute 
First, the statutory language supports the application of a “likelihood of 
dilution” standard in inter partes proceedings. The TTAB may either refuse 
to register
123
 or cancel the registration
124
 of a “mark which when used would 
cause dilution under section 1125(c).”125 The statute refers to dilution in the 
future tense. By using the words “when used,” Congress authorized the 
TTAB to take action against junior users who have not yet used the mark in 
commerce. The words “would cause” bolster this interpretation. The 
language does not require a mark to “cause” dilution presently; instead, it 
only requires that the mark “would cause” dilution if used in the future.126 
This language supports a “likelihood of dilution” standard. A mark simply 
cannot cause actual economic harm before it is even used in the 
 
 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. V 1999). See supra note 1 for the text of this section. The FTDA 
provides for injunctive relief and damages, although damages are only recoverable for willful dilution. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 122. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 27:14. 
 123. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (Supp. V 1999). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (emphasis added). 
 126. Contrast this interpretation with the Fourth Circuit’s statutory analysis in Ringling Bros., 
where the court concluded that the FTDA requires proof of “actual economic harm” because “[t]he 
conduct proscribed is ‘another person’s . . . use,’ not merely threatened use; that ‘causes,’ not that 
‘will’ or ‘may’ cause.” Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 170 F.3d 449, 461 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999). 
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marketplace.
127
 Therefore, the TTAB should consider the “likelihood” that a 
junior mark will dilute a senior mark when either refusing to register or 
canceling the registration of the junior mark. 
2. Legislative History 
Second, the legislative history of the TAA clearly supports the application 
of a “likelihood of dilution” standard in inter partes proceedings before the 
TTAB. First, the House Report on House Bill 1565
128
 stated that resolving 
the dilution issue before the TTAB “would provide certainty to competing 
trademark interests, before the applicant has invested significant resources in 
its proposed mark, and before dilution-type damage has been suffered in the 
marketplace by the owner of the famous mark.”129  
Second, in the hearings on House Bill 1565, all relevant witnesses stated 
that the TAA would allow trademark owners to resolve a dilution issue early 
in the process.
130
 Representative Coble contrasted the TAA with the FTDA, 
stating that whereas the FTDA “provides for injunctive relief after an 
identical or similar mark has been in use and has caused actual dilution of a 
famous mark,”131 the TAA “would provide holders of famous marks with the 
right to oppose or seek cancellation of a mark that would cause dilution.”132 
This language supports a “likelihood of dilution” standard. The legislators 
used the future tense to describe actionable behavior under the TAA, 
demonstrating that senior users could obtain relief prior to the use in 
commerce of a diluting junior mark.  
Additionally, the legislators who enacted the TAA clearly meant to 
 
 
 127. This was a primary concern of the Second Circuit in the Nabisco decision. Nabisco, Inc. v. 
PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999). There, the Second Circuit stated that an “actual 
dilution” standard “could not be invoked until injury had occurred,” id., and “because the statute 
provides only for an injunction[,] . . . such injury would never be compensated.” Id.  
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 106-250 (1999). 
 129. Id. at 5-6. See also supra note 96. 
 130. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Those witnesses which did not state this opinion 
could not be characterized as disagreeing with it. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 88, at 3-5 (statement of 
Q. Todd Dickinson, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Acting Commissioner of Patents & 
Trademarks, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office). 
 131. Hearing, supra note 88, at 1 (statement of the Honorable Howard Coble, Chairman) 
(emphasis added).  
 132. Id. (emphasis added). In his remarks, Senator Hatch added that without the ability to oppose 
or petition to cancel a diluting junior mark, “the owner of a famous mark must stand idly by 
throughout the registration process and await recourse through costly litigation in federal court only 
after he has suffered harm to his mark.” 145 CONG. REC. S7,452-04 (daily ed. June 22, 1999). Accord 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-250, at 5-6 (1999) (contrasting the FTDA’s requirements of “use” and “actual 
dilution” with the ability to oppose or petition to cancel under the TAA).  
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alleviate the difficulties raised by the “actual dilution” requirement,133 
thereby affirming the TTAB’s use of a “likelihood of dilution” standard 
when adjudicating opposition or cancellation proceedings.  
3. Policy Rationale 
Finally, several policy reasons support the TTAB’s use of a “likelihood of 
dilution” standard in inter partes proceedings. First, it would be illogical for 
Congress to impose an “actual dilution” standard on the TTAB in opposition 
or cancellation proceedings. Congress enacted the TAA to give senior users 
“a more timely and inexpensive resolution of the dilution issue”134 than 
resolution before a federal district court.
135
 An “actual dilution” standard 
would frustrate this policy goal, requiring senior users to demonstrate actual 
economic harm in the marketplace before the TTAB would grant relief.
136
  
Second, a senior user should be able to oppose or petition to cancel a 
junior mark prior to actual injury. “Coupled with the ‘second backstop’ of a 
cancellation proceeding, the opposition procedure allows anyone who may 
be damaged by a registration to challenge the application even before it is 
finally and officially given federal sanction and the benefits of Lanham Act 
registration.”137 Requiring a senior user to prove “actual economic harm” 
before the TTAB will grant relief would contravene the policies underlying 
opposition and cancellation, which seek to address the damage caused by 
registration of a junior mark before such damage actually occurs.  
B. The “Actual Dilution” Standard 
A federal district court should apply an “actual dilution” standard when 
adjudicating a section 43(c) dilution claim. First, the statutory language 
supports an “actual dilution” standard for section 43(c) claims. Second, the 
legislative history of the TAA supports the application of an “actual dilution” 
 
 
 133. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S7,452-54 (daily ed. June 22, 1999) (Senator Hatch stating that “at 
least one circuit has held that likelihood of dilution is not enough, the trademark owner must prove 
actual dilution”). 
 134. H.R. REP. NO. 106-250, at 5-6 (1999). 
 135. Id. See supra note 96. 
 136. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that 
consumer surveys are “expensive, time-consuming and not immune to manipulation”). See also Toro 
Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q. 1164, 1174 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (“To require actual use by the 
applicant before a dilution claim could be recognized by the Board would . . . defeat the purpose of the 
TAA.”). 
 137. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 19, § 20:2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/4
   
 
 
 
 
 
2001] “CAUSES DILUTION” CAUSING PROBLEMS 1181 
 
 
 
 
standard. Finally, there are several policy reasons that support the adoption of 
this standard. 
1. Language of the Statute 
First, the statutory language of section 43(c) supports an “actual dilution” 
standard. Unlike both the state antidilution statutes
138
 and the inter partes 
provisions added by the TAA,
139
 section 43(c) requires present dilution for 
actionability. Section 43(c) only provides relief if the junior user’s mark 
“causes dilution”140 of the senior user’s mark. Congress used the langauge 
“causes dilution” in the present tense,141 unlike the “when used” and “would 
cause” language discussed above.142 If Congress intended to provide relief 
for future dilution, it would have used future-tense language.
143
 
2. Legislative History 
Second, the legislative history of the TAA supports the application of an 
“actual dilution” standard. Congress stated unequivocally that the FTDA 
only provides for relief after the junior mark “has been in use and has caused 
actual dilution of a famous mark.”144 Moreover, the legislative history shows 
that Congress was fully aware of the Ringling Bros. case.
145
 If Congress truly 
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the “causes dilution” 
language, then it could have easily amended section 43(c) to state “causes a 
likelihood of dilution.”146 
 
 
 138. See supra notes 23, 47 for discussion of the state anti-dilution statutes. 
 139. See supra notes 123-33 and accompany text for discussion of the “likelihood of dilution” 
standard as applied to inter partes proceedings. 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. V 1999). 
 141. The Fourth Circuit’s statutory analysis in Ringling Bros. is correct on this point. Ringling 
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 170 F.3d 449, 460-61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
923 (1999). The Second Circuit in Nabisco even conceded that the language of the FTDA “gives some 
support” to an “actual dilution” standard, “in that it uses the formulation, ‘causes dilution,’ rather than 
referring to ‘likelihood of dilution.’” Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464). See also supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 123-33.  
 143. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461 (“[I]n the face of the obvious centrality of ‘likelihood of 
dilution’ provisions in the interpretation and application of state antidilution statutes for the fifty years 
of their existence, the [FTDA] does not so provide.”). 
 144. H.R. REP. NO. 106-250, at 5 (1999). See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text. 
 145. See 145 CONG. REC. S7,452-54 (daily ed. June 22, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating 
that “at least one circuit has held that likelihood of dilution is not enough, the trademark owner must 
prove actual dilution”); Hearing, supra note 88, at 8-9 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive 
Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association) (discussing the impact of the Ringling 
Bros. case). 
 146. Legislative inaction following judicial interpretation of a statute is not necessarily evidence 
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3. Policy Rationale 
Finally, numerous policy reasons support an “actual dilution” standard. 
First, senior users that are able to initiate administrative proceedings before 
the TTAB but fail to do so should be subject to a more stringent standard. 
Congress enacted the TAA, in part, to make dilution actions more efficient 
by increasing the number of cases resolved at the administrative level.
147
 
Parties that do not take advantage of these efficiencies should not benefit 
from a more flexible standard.  
Second, even though some senior users cannot initiate inter partes 
proceedings in certain situations, these senior users may still have state-law 
causes of action. Federal preemption of state antidilution statutes only applies 
to federally registered marks.
148
 A senior user may still file a state dilution 
action in situations where the junior user has neither filed for nor received a 
federal trademark registration. In addition, a senior user may still bring a state 
dilution action even if the junior user has yet to use the mark in commerce 
because most state statutes only require a showing of a “likelihood of 
dilution.”149  
Finally, even though an “actual dilution” standard removes a substantial 
number of claims from the FTDA’s scope, this result is consistent with 
congressional intent.
150
 
 
 
that the legislature intends to adopt that interpretation. 2B SUTHERLAND, supra note 88, § 49:10, at 
112-17. However,  
[w]here action upon a statute or practical and contemporaneous interpretation has been called to 
the legislature’s attention, there is more reason to regard the failure of the legislature to change the 
interpretation as presumptive evidence of its correctness. Likewise, legislative action by 
amendment . . . with respect to other parts of a law which have received a contemporaneous and 
practical construction may indicate approval of interpretations pertaining to the unchanged and 
unaffected parts of the law. 
Id. at 117-19 (internal footnotes omitted). See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 
U.S. 512, 535 (1982) (“Where ‘an agency’s statutory construction has been ‘fully brought 
to the attention of the public and the Congress,’ and the latter has not sought to alter that 
interpretation although it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the 
legislative intent has been correctly discerned.’”) (citations omitted). 
 147. See supra note 96. 
 148. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (Supp. V 1999). 
 149. See supra notes 23, 47 for discussion of the state anti-dilution statutes. 
 150. See Hearing, supra note 88, at 8-9 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, 
American Intellectual Property Law Association) (noting that an “actual dilution” standard “might 
encourage [owners of ‘famous’ marks] to bring more actions under State dilution statutes and the 
common law”). 
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V. PROPOSAL 
The “actual dilution” or “likelihood of dilution” standards will be adopted 
in two different contexts: (1) by the TTAB in an opposition or cancellation 
proceeding and (2) by a federal district court adjudicating a section 43(c) 
proceeding. For the reasons stated above, the TTAB should apply a 
“likelihood of dilution” standard when adjudicating inter partes proceedings, 
and a federal district court should apply an “actual dilution” standard when 
adjudicating a section 43(c) claim.
151
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The split between the federal circuit courts over the definition of “causes 
dilution” in the FTDA creates an uncertainty in trademark law that the courts 
must resolve. By enacting the TAA, Congress signaled its intent as to the 
correct interpretation of the statutory language. For the reasons stated above, 
the TTAB should adopt a “likelihood of dilution” standard when adjudicating 
opposition and cancellation proceedings, but a federal district court should 
adopt an “actual dilution” standard when adjudicating a section 43(c) claim. 
David L. Orwick

 
 
 
 151. Although a federal district court can hear appeals from TTAB decisions, see supra notes 117-
20 and accompanying text, this situation does not change this Note’s proposal in any material way. A 
federal district court should apply an “actual dilution” standard when adjudicating a Section 43(c) 
claim added to an appeal of a TTAB decision, just as a district court would apply that standard when a 
trademark holder initiates the litigation in federal district court. However, the “actual dilution” 
standard would not apply to the review of the TTAB decision because the district court is serving in an 
appellate capacity. As such, the district court is only reviewing the TTAB’s decision for error, not 
applying new legal standards to the facts of the case. 
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